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In this paper, I address the issue of to what extent the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation describes scientific practice. I rely on a time period from the history of High Energy Physics (HEP), which spans from early 1960s to early 1970s. I argue that theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE), which grounds theory-dominated conception of experimentation is too coarse-grained inasmuch as it prevents us from seeing the correct relationship that exists between theorizing and experimenting in the scientific practice of HEP. I articulate that in order to be able to get a better understanding of scientific practice, a revision needs to be made in the general conception of TLE. I propose that such a revision is possible if we abandon the commitment that experimentation is always driven by theory. I consider what I call “theory-drivenness” of experimentation (TDE) as a form of theory-ladenness, which amounts to the claim that experiments, from their initial design up to their final stage, are carried out under the framework of a prevailing theory for the purpose of providing definite answers to specific questions already posed by the same theory. I argue that electron-proton inelastic scattering experiments in HEP were firstly carried out without having any recourse to a phenomenological model. From here, I claim that these experiments are not theory-laden in the sense implied by TDE. On the other hand, I argue, inelastic scattering experiments are theory-laden due to the fact that the scientists who perform them are committed to background theories of HEP. That is, I admit the validity of TLE as a philosophical claim, but I attribute a weaker status to it as opposed to its general conception. That is, I propose to differentiate TDE from TLE by claiming that TLE does not entail TDE.

1. Introduction
The debate concerning the relationship between theory and experiment has a long history in philosophy of science. The reason why this debate has been so long-lived can be traced to its philosophical implications that pertain to epistemological issues such as theory-testing and theory-construction and also to other perennial debates in philosophy of science such as the realism-antirealism debate. Logical empiricists subordinated the role of experimentation and acknowledged it as one of the conventional ways of theory testing. During the post-positivist era, while the subordinated role of experimentation remained almost unchanged, theory dominated conception of scientific experimentation was advanced and used as an argument to defend relativism in science against its positivist conceptions. During this period, the emphasis was mainly given to the relationship between theoretical commitments and sense perception. After its articulation by Norwood Russell Hanson​[1]​, the thesis of theory-ladenness of observation (TLO) became a slogan under which the dominance of theory—or more generally, theoretical concepts—over sense experience was highlighted. One philosophical implication of TLO has been the thesis of theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE). Thomas Kuhn, in his groundbreaking book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions​[2]​, associated TLE with the notion of paradigm and conceived experimentation as guided by theoretical commitments that pertain to a particular scientific field. 
Until the early 1980s, the philosophy of scientific experimentation had been largely framed by TLE, and this theory-dominated view had been accepted as the received view of scientific experimentation. Ian Hacking’s rejection of the received view in the early 1980s opened the door to a new conception of scientific experimentation. In his Representing and Intervening​[3]​, Hacking argues that it would be wrong to subordinate experiment to theory. Unlike the proponents of the received view, he acknowledges experimentation as an activity which is by itself capable of generating genuine scientific knowledge of the world. This line of reasoning was pursued by philosophers such as Peter Galison, Allen Franklin and Robert Ackermann, and it was dubbed the New Experimentalism. 
Yet, there is a sense in which Hacking’s discussion in some parts of Representing and Intervening is ambiguous regarding the relation between theory and experiment. While Hacking admits that he “make[s] no claim that experimental work could exist independently of theory,”​[4]​ he argues on to argue that “much truly fundamental research precedes any relevant theory whatsoever.”​[5]​ In a latter work​[6]​, Hacking seems to be much more precise and makes a distinction between different levels of theory as systematic theories and topical hypotheses. According to Hacking, systematic theories are high level theories and do not necessarily have experimental consequences. Whereas topical hypotheses are relatively low level empirical generalizations, and their sole function is to connect systematic theory to the phenomena of interest. However, Hacking’s analysis is incomplete as it does not touch upon the important question of what the implications of such a distinction with regards to TLE would be.
In more recent years, the relation between theory and experiment has been examined in somewhat more detail. An important contribution has come from Friedrich Steinle,​[7]​ who has argued that TLE as conceived in the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation falls short in capturing both the complexity and diversity of scientific experimentation. Steinle reaches this conclusion in the light of a contrast he introduces between two types of experimentations, namely, “theory-driven” and “exploratory” experimentations. According to Steinle, theory-driven experimentation is “done with a well-formed theory in mind, from the very-first idea, via the specific design and the execution, to the evaluation.” ​[8]​ On the other hand, Steinle defines exploratory experimentation as not guided by any theory whatsoever in the same way as theory-driven experimentation. Rather, exploratory experimentation is largely “driven by the elementary desire to obtain empirical regularities and to find out proper concepts and classifications by means of which those regularities can be formulated.”​[9]​ It is Steinle’s claim that exploratory experimentation, unlike the theory-driven one, has features that are not captured by the received view of scientific experimentation. He defends the validity of his claim by focusing on case studies from the history of electricity—in particular, Dufay’s, Ampere’s and Faraday’s experiments. 
In this paper, I address the issue of to what extent theory dominated conception of scientific experimentation describes scientific practice. I argue that TLE, which grounds the theory dominated view of scientific experimentation, is too coarse-grained inasmuch as it prevents us from recognizing the diversity of the relationship that exists between theorizing and experimenting in scientific practice. Due to this undifferentiated conception of TLE, even in some cases it is virtually impossible to determine the correct nature of theory-experiment relationship. I believe that a finer conception of TLE is both possible and necessary for a better understanding of scientific practice. I think that this can be accomplished by first acknowledging the fact that scientific practice is rich enough to accommodate different forms of TLE. Therefore, I suggest that TLE should be construed as an umbrella concept covering different forms of TLE. 
I propose to differentiate the form of theory-ladenness which I shall call “theory-drivenness of experimentation” (TDE) from other forms of TLE. I take TDE to characterize theory-ladenness in cases in which scientific experimentation, from its initial design up to its final stage, is performed under the dominance of an enabling theory that describes the phenomena under scrutiny. I regard theory driven experiments as primarily conducted to test experimental predictions of their enabling theories. But, I stress, this is not the only objective of theory-driven type of experimentation. Theory-driven experiments are also performed to discover further empirical consequences of their enabling theories. While I admit that there are cases in scientific practice where TDE is valid, I disagree with the view that every experiment in science is performed as described by TDE. Rather, I think that while experimentation is theory-laden, apart from testing predictions of scientific theories, it might contribute to theorizing in different ways at various stages of scientific research. It is worth pointing out that what I take to be correct about scientific experimentation should not be construed as asserting that there is room for scientific experimentation which is totally free of theory, or more generally, of theoretical commitments. Rather, my claim is that TLE does not necessarily entail TDE. That is, I attribute a weaker status to TLE as opposed to the one attributed by the theory dominated view of scientific experimentation. I claim that it would be wrong to simply associate TLE with TDE. I propose a revision to the standard conception of TLE, and in this way I aim to describe cases of experimentation which the theory dominated view fails to describe with its standard conception of TLE.
According to Steinle, one characterizing aspect of exploratory experimentation is that it is typical to the opening up of new research fields.​[10]​ As far as Steinle’s case studies are concerned, what he seems to mean by “new research field” is a research domain in which there is no well-established theoretical framework. It is also to be noted that Steinle does not claim that his distinction between exploratory and theory-driven experimentations is an exhaustive one. Rather, he admits that there may be experiments that do not fall under these two categories, and he points out that a much finer distinction is needed. In what follows, I will contend that one virtue of differentiating TDE from other forms of TLE in scientific practice could help us recognize the relative autonomy of experimentation and thereby better identify the exploratory character of experimentation in some historical cases. I will argue that the epistemic appropriateness of exploratory experimentation is not restricted to research fields in which there is no well-established theoretical framework, but is also valid in research domains which are occupied by well-established theories, or so to speak, mature theories of physics. In that respect, high energy particle physics (HEP)—a discipline of physics that pursues the understanding of fundamental building blocks of nature and the forces between them—represents a research field which is dominated by particle physics theories of quantum mechanics(QM). In order to be able to pursue my goals in this paper, in the ensuing discussion, I will rely on an episode from the history of HEP which spans from early 1960s to early 1970s. What makes this period interesting for the philosophy of scientific experimentation is that it represents an era in HEP where both the ways of theorizing and of experimenting changed drastically over time. The historical episode that I will focus on started with the hegemony of a HEP theory—namely, the scattering-matrix theory (SMT)—which later faced both theoretical and experimental challenges. The era eventually culminated in the emergence of a new and widely accepted theory of physics which is today known as the theory of quantum chromodynamics (QCD). 

2. Recent Perspectives in the Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation
Steinle’s work has triggered a new discussion centering on the possibility of theory-free experimentation. Michael Heidelberger has addressed the issue in the context of different conceptions of TLE.​[11]​ Heidelberger first identifies the claim that “the disposition to make a particular observation depends upon the theoretical background of the observer”​[12]​ as a form of theory-ladenness and calls it theory-guidance. He then goes on to claim that theory guidance does not represent a genuine from of theory-ladenness. Heidelberger’s warrant for this claim is that dispositions are irrelevant to the meaning of observation sentences. Furthermore, Heidelberger proposes to distinguish between different levels of experimentation, namely, that “experimentation at the causal level, where instrumental manipulation is distinguished, and experimentation taking place at the theoretical level, where the results at the causal level are represented in a theoretical structure.”​[13]​ Heidelberger then goes on to make a two-fold distinction with regard to TLE as theory-ladenness due to causal understanding and TLE due to theoretical interpretation. In the light of this distinction, he asserts that there are many cases—like Roentgen’s early series of experimentation on X-rays—in which experimentation proceeds only at the causal level without having any recourse to a theoretical framework. Heidelberger further adds that in well-established theories these two levels are inextricably connected to each other, and thus experimentation proceeds at both levels. However, claims Heidelberger, in cases when a new domain is explored, experimentation proceeds only at the causal level, and is theory-free. By claiming this, Heidelberger’s view seems to bear close similarities to that of Steinle about exploratory experimentation. Yet, there seems to exist an important difference between these two views. Heidelberger seems to argue against TLE by claiming that experiments conducted only at the causal level are theory-free. On the other hand, Steinle does not seem to deny the role of background theories in the case of exploratory experimentation, and in this respect, his views seem to diverge from those of Heidelberger about the possibility of theory-free experimentation. Therefore, I do not think that Steinle’s view about exploratory experimentation could be taken as an account against the validity of TLE in general. Nevertheless, despite the existing nuances between their accounts, it is clear that both Steinle and Heidelberger acknowledge that experiment has certain autonomy in front of theory. 
Martin Carrier challenges New Experimentalism by arguing that it is grounded in the conviction that “experimental results can be obtained and interpreted largely independently from higher-level theories, and this feature accounts for their stability.”​[14]​ Carrier refers to this claim as the stability thesis, and disputes its validity by taking into account Hacking’s contention that high-level theories do not necessarily have bearing on experimentation. In Carrier’s view, understanding of how the experimental set up works is provided by what he calls observation theories. In this sense, Carrier views every measurement as a theoretical interpretation of what kind of intervention takes place between the instruments used in experimentation and the phenomena under scrutiny. From here, Carrier goes on to claim that data acquisition in experimentation largely depends upon what kinds of observation theories are taken into account. It is to be noted that this claim of Carrier’s is in stark contrast with Heidelberger’s contention that experimentation can proceed without having any recourse to a theoretical framework. Moreover, Carrier holds the view that there is no fundamental difference between observation theories and explanation theories which account for the phenomena under consideration. According to Carrier, the context of experimentation decides whichever theory is to be used as an observation theory and which one as an explanation theory. While a theory is used as an observation theory in a certain context, it can be used as an explanation theory in a different context. That is, observation theories can be as high-level and systematic as explanation theories. This view of Carrier’s clearly stands at odds with that of Hacking, who seems to claim that systematic high-level theories typically do not play substantive role in experimentation.
Hans Radder has put forward a similar account. Radder introduces the concept of material realization of the experimental process to characterize both the objects, or phenomena, under scrutiny and experimental set up as well as the interaction between these two. ​[15]​ In Radder’s view, establishment of a stable correlation between some feature of the phenomena being examined and some feature of the experimental set up is constitutive to experimentation. Radder attacks the theory-free view of scientific experimentation by arguing that “materially realizing a stable correlation and knowing what can be learned about the objects from inspecting the apparatus depends upon theoretical insights about the experimental system and its environment.”​[16]​ Radder does not claim that experimental processes are all described by full-fledged theories. He rather admits “the possibility of a description of the material realization of experiments in common nontheoretical language.”​[17]​ In this respect, Radder’s account appears less theory-centered than that of Carrier.
My discussion so far indicates that much of the current debate in the philosophy of scientific experimentation has been focused on the question of whether or not theory-free experimentation is possible. In this debate, while the proponents of the theory-free experimentation acknowledge that there are cases in which theory is not constitutive to experimentation, those who argue against this view insist that theory always has a role in experimentation, even though the significance of that role might change as the experimental context changes. What is to be noted in this debate is the parallel between the approaches of Hacking and Carrier. Despite their conflicting accounts, both Hacking and Carrier make a distinction between different levels of theories with regard to experimentation. While Hacking sees a distinction between systematic theories and topical hypotheses, Carrier distinguishes observation theories from explanation theories. However, they reach conflicting conclusions with regards to implications of the classification of theories according to their roles in experimentation. 
In what follows, I will follow an approach similar to those adopted by Hacking and Carrier. In order to differentiate TDE as a form of theory-ladenness, I will draw on an important characteristic of HEP. I will bring out the distinction between background theories of HEP, which embody fundamental laws concerning interactions between elementary particles, and phenomenological models—or forefront theories—,which contain phenomenological laws, namely, laws which are derived from fundamental laws and which relate to phenomena of interest. In this way, I seek to correctly identify what is at work on the theory side of the relationship between theory and experiment in HEP experiments. 

3. Theorizing in High Energy Physics: Background Theories, Model Theories and Phenomenological Models

HEP is the branch of physics dealing with the fundamental constituents of matter and their mutual interactions. Most of the interactions between elementary particles do not occur under normal circumstances in nature, but created and detected during very energetic collisions, as is done in particle accelerators. At subatomic levels and at very high energies quantum mechanical effects dominate over the classical ones, and interactions between subatomic particles are properly treated by theories that conform to QM. In HEP, the group of theories which I shall call background theories provide basic rules and principles as to how to treat mutual interactions of subatomic particles. However, given the diversity and complexity of nuclear interactions, these rules and principles fall short in explaining nuclear phenomena. Explanation of nuclear phenomena is typically provided by model theories which are constructed under the theoretical frameworks of background theories. Model theories are more elaborate theories when compared with background theories. Their theoretical frameworks are relatively much richer. And also, they accommodate a relatively greater number of conceptual and structural elements. These include phenomena-specific principles, hypotheses and mechanisms which background theories do not possess. By virtue of these structural and conceptual elements, model theories are able to relate to their target phenomena and provide explanations. In order to exemplify the above distinction, in what follows I will focus on Quantum Field Theory (QFT) and the Standard Model of particle physics.
QFT is one of the background theories of HEP. It is basically a relativistic field theory which gives rules—such as canonical quantization—to quantize force fields and techniques –such as renormalization—to extract observable quantities—such as binding energy and decay width—from theoretical calculations.​[18]​ QFT is also the underlying theory of the Standard Model, which should be best read for the collective name of a group of particle physics theories—namely, the electro-weak theory (EWT) and QCD. While EWT describes both weak and electromagnetic interactions and their unity, QCD describes strong interactions. Both of these theories adopt the field theoretic approach of QFT and treat the mutual interactions of elementary particles as quantized fields. 
In QFT, the Lagrangian density function (simply the Lagrangian) is taken to be the basic dynamical quantity. It is used to calculate the field equations governing the dynamics of the fields and their associated physical quantities such as energy and momentum. QFT does not impose any specific form of Lagrangian.​[19]​ Rather, it provides the mathematical formalism necessary to make the dynamical analysis of fields. It gives rules and techniques as to how to make theoretical calculations given a specific Lagrangian and to extract experimentally observable consequences from these calculations. Whereas, in both EWT and QCD the exact form of the Lagrangian is fixed. Since these theories describe different types of interactions, they adopt Lagrangians of different form for the explanation of their target phenomena. In addition, both EWT and QCD impose symmetry conditions. While EWT satisfies SU(2) gauge symmetry, QCD satisfies SU(3) gauge symmetry. In each of these theories, the underlying symmetry principle is represented as the invariance of the Lagrangian under a symmetry transformation. It is to be noted that neither of these symmetries is dictated by QFT. Rather, in each case, the incorporation of the symmetry formalism into the theoretical structure of the theory is guided by an additional symmetry argument stating the conservation of a specific physical quantity during the mediation of the interaction under consideration. This quantity is the “weak isotopic spin” in the case of EWT, and it is the “color charge” in the case of QCD. Moreover, both EWT and QCD explain their target phenomena by appealing to mechanisms which are again not dictated by QFT. In EWT, the way how the intermediate vector bosons—the mediators of the weak force—acquire their mass is explained by a mechanism called the “spontaneous symmetry breaking.” And, in QCD, the motion of quarks within the nucleus is accounted for by a mechanism called “asymptotic freedom.” It is to be noted that none of these mechanisms is directly derivable from QFT. Rather, their construction and their incorporation into the theoretical structure of these theories require further theoretical considerations which are not available in the framework of QFT.
My discussion so far shows that the construction of both EWT and QCD largely depends upon the mathematical formalism provided by QFT. They both employ QFT’s field theoretic approach for the quantization of force fields. But, they have their own theoretical structure. They accommodate structural elements in the form of hypotheses—such as symmetry principles—and physical mechanisms which QFT does not contain. It is by virtue of their structural elements that both QCD and EWT explain their target phenomena. Therefore, I distinguish EWT and QCD from QFT and call them “model theories.” Let me note that the distinction I draw here between background theories of HEP and its model theories is not restricted to QFT, nor to theories of the Standard Model. Rather, I claim, the distinction applies to the whole domain of HEP. In the next section, I will adopt the same distinction when I introduce the scattering-matrix theory.
An important inadequacy of model theories of HEP is that they typically do not fully describe much of their target phenomena. They account for their very essential features, but fail to capture their various underlying complexities which are manifest in experimental data. In order to interpret these complexities as well as to understand their implications with regards to the phenomena under scrutiny, one needs to make certain refinements on the experimental data. However, model theories fall short in providing the necessary refinements. More importantly, they generally do not have experimentally measureable consequences about their target phenomena. Since model theories are typically not amenable to experimentation when taken all by themselves, HEP experiments are typically conducted by theoretical models which I shall call “phenomenological models.” Just as model theories are constructed by supplementing background theories of HEP to explain the basic features of elementary particles and to understand their mutual interactions, phenomenological models are constructed by supplementing model theories. Phenomenological models specifically serve the purpose of confronting theoretical findings of model theories of HEP with experimental data and to decode them for their experimentally observable consequences. The essential difference between model theories of HEP and their various phenomenological models lies in the hypotheses, techniques and mechanisms used and the assumptions made with regard to the phenomena of interest. All these theoretical ingredients are more detailed and more-phenomena-specific in phenomenological models than in model theories. As a result, unlike model theories, phenomenological models are specific enough to offer predictions that are directly testable through experimentation, and also they are much more tractable for the analysis of experimental data as well as the design of the experimental set up. On the other hand, the structural elements phenomenological models accommodate are applicable for a relatively narrow domain of phenomena, and thus serve the specific purpose of decoding model theories for their observable consequences only in this relatively narrow domain. Thus, one can say that phenomenological models have a relatively narrower range of applicability with respect to model theories.
To sum up, I have drawn a three-fold distinction with regard to theory construction in HEP. Here, what I mean by the term “theory” is to be taken in a broader context to signify not just background theories and model theories of HEP but also its phenomenological models. This, I think, is also compatible with HEP physicists’ use of the term to also mean phenomenological models. My discussion suggests that background theories of HEP play the role of a meta-theory for model theories. And, phenomenological models, by virtue of their ability to make direct contact with their target phenomena through experimentation, are the genuine bearers of physical understanding in HEP.
In the next few sections, I will introduce the scattering-matrix research program which was influential in HEP in1960s. I will discuss the appropriateness of the background theory-model theory-phenomenological model distinction within the scope of this research program.

4. The Rise of the Scattering-Matrix Research Program: A Democracy of Particles
In HEP, the quantity called the “total scattering cross-section” gives a measure of the scattering rate of the particles impinging on a target particle in terms of the scattering angle. One of the main tasks in HEP is to calculate the scattering cross section of nuclear reactions. During the period following the World War II, the only theoretical tool used by particle physicists for the cross-section calculation was the Feynman diagram method invented by the American physicist Richard Feynman. This method employs QFT’s perturbative approach—a set of approximation techniques—to the calculation of scattering cross-section. Each term in the perturbation expansion of the scattering amplitude corresponds to one of the intermediate states associated with the interaction under consideration. And, each intermediate state is schematically represented by a diagram, where the straight lines signify the world lines of the particles and the vertices signify their mutual interactions. If one wants to calculate the total scattering cross section for a certain reaction, one needs to sum up over the amplitudes of all possible intermediate states. Feynman diagram method had been very successful in the framework of quantum electro-dynamics (QED)—another model theory of QFT that applies to electro-magnetic interactions that occur between electrically charged particles by the exchange of photons. However, QFT’s perturbative approach was not a valid approach when performing cross section calculations associated with hadrons,​[20]​ which experience only the strong nuclear force. In those cases, due to the fact that strong interaction coupling constant is large, perturbation expansion yielded divergent terms, and no technique was available to extract observable quantities from the infinite results of the perturbation calculations—the commonly called renormalization problem.​[21]​ 
From the mid-1950’s onwards, physicists’ interest gradually shifted from QFT to the scattering-matrix theory (SMT), which was proposed by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg in his seminal 1943 papers.​[22]​ In constructing SMT as an alternative theory of QFT, Heisenberg had a simple motivation, which can be summarized as follows. In QFT, the basic entities are fields, rather than particles. Yet, fields are not directly observable quantities. On the other hand, experiments in HEP are scattering experiments, in which only particles are detected. Heisenberg suggested that only experimentally ascertainable quantities should enter theories of HEP. He considered the scattering-matrix (S-matrix)—whose components are directly related to observable quantities—as the fundamental dynamical quantity, rather than the Lagrangian as in QFT. ​[23]​ If one knows the S-matrix associated with a nuclear reaction, one can calculate the scattering cross section, the binding energy and the decay rate of this reaction, i.e., almost all of its properties that can be tested by experiment. There was the urgency of the study of strong interactions, and SMT was considered as an alternative to QFT. However, SMT did not prove very useful in its form originally proposed by Heisenberg in the study of strong interactions, as the S-matrix equations gave rise to an infinite set of coupled differential equations which were yet to be solved exactly. 
The situation in HEP at the end of 1950s was very desperate as far as the physics of strong interactions was concerned. Both QFT and SMT were beset by the technical problems that seemed insurmountable. In the early 1960s, a proposal came from the American physicist Geoffrey Chew—a strong adherent of SMT. Chew was strongly convinced that QFT was completely useless for the study of strong interactions, and he proposed that it be simply abandoned and replaced by SMT. In contrast to the hierarchical taxonomic approach of QFT, Chew suggested that each strongly interacting particle should be treated equally. To this end, he proposed to supplement SMT by what he called the “bootstrap hypothesis,”​[24]​ which conjectured a mutual generation mechanism for all particles interacting via strong force—the bootstrap mechanism. According to this mechanism, no particle was “elementary”; rather each strongly interacting particle was conceived as a composite (or bound state) of all the other strongly interacting particles. All strongly interacting particles were on the same footing in the sense that they bootstraped each other, which in turn helped to generate themselves.​[25]​ Since the bootstrap mechanism demanded the equal treatment of all strongly interacting particles, Chew’s approach to the physics of strong interactions was later dubbed “nuclear democracy.” 
SMT as developed by Chew was basically a theory of strong interactions. This new form of SMT was free of some of the technical difficulties besetting the original SMT. However, Chew’s theory was still far from offering experimentally testable predictions. Nor was it amenable to the analysis of experimental data. The next task was to apply this new SMT to experiments. To this end, Chew, in a jointly written paper​[26]​ with Stanley Mandelstam and Steven Frautschi, considered a mathematical technique due to the Italian theoretical physicist Tullio Regge.​[27]​ Regge had introduced the concept of “complex angular momentum” and conjectured that scattering calculations should be performed in terms of energy and momentum variables on the complex plane, instead of momentum transfer values.​[28]​ By using this approach—also known as “Regge pole hypothesis”—, he had devised a mathematical technique as to how to calculate the scattering amplitudes in a scattering process and further established a bound on their asymptotic behaviors. Regge had proposed this technique for non-relativistic regime, but it was soon applied by the team of Chew, Frautschi and Mandelstam into the relativistic regime and incorporated into the bootstrap mechanism as a boundary condition at small momentum transfers values, i.e., at small scattering angles. 
This further elaboration rescued SMT from some of the technical difficulties it faced, especially from the ones encountered with solving bootstrap equations. More importantly for the future of the scattering matrix research program, this new form of Chew’s SMT—also known as Regge theory—was able to give experimentally testable predictions about hadron-hadron scatterings. The key prediction of Regge theory was that at high energies and at small scattering angles the hadron-hadron scattering cross section would fall rapidly with the increase of the momentum transfer during the interaction. This meant that the scattering cross section would be low at large scattering angles. By the mid 1960s, Regge theory proved very useful in the experimental studies of strong interactions between hadrons. The match between the predictions of Regge theory and the experimental data that soon came out from various experiments​[29]​ played an important role in its wide acceptance by the physics community. 
Before I close this section, I want to discuss the scattering-matrix research program in terms of the distinction I brought up in the previous section between background theories of HEP and their applications to nuclear phenomena. At the outset, let me restate the criterion I have adopted to distinguish between background and model theories of HEP. My criterion for this distinction is that even though model theories are constructed on the frameworks of background theories, as their frameworks accommodate additional structural and conceptual elements by virtue of which they are able to relate to their target phenomena. The following might be helpful to see how Heisenberg and Chew’s SM theories stand to each other. SMT, as originally proposed by Heisenberg, is a quantum theory of scattering phenomena. Its theoretical framework comprises rules and principles that enable more elaborate particle physics theories to be constructed. Chew’s SMT was constructed on this framework as a theory of strong interactions. In this sense, Heisenberg’s SMT plays the role of a meta-theory in SM research program—as does QFT in the Standard Model. However, unlike Heisenberg’s SMT, Chew’s SMT is able to offer an explanation as to how subatomic particles interact via strong force. It does this by invoking the principle (or the doctrine) of nuclear democracy as a guiding principle and by appealing to the bootstrap mechanism which is exclusively applicable to its target phenomena, i.e., strong interactions. These in turn respectively amount to conceptual and structural differences between Heisenberg and Chew’s SM theories. In light of these considerations, I identify Heisenberg’s SMT as the background theory of the scattering-matrix research program and Chew’s SMT as the model theory of strong interactions in this program. 
Chew’s SMT by itself does not offer experimentally testable predictions about its target phenomena, i.e., strong interactions. Consequently, in the scattering-matrix research program, theory enters experimentation largely via Regge theory. As I have mentioned earlier, successful predictions of Regge theory about hadronic processes expedited the establishment of the scattering research program. Regge theory represents one elaboration of Chew’s SMT in the sense that it was constructed by supplementing this theory with the Regge pole hypothesis. Much of the predictive power of Regge theory comes from the Regge pole hypothesis, which governs the asymptotic behavior of elastic scattering amplitude at high energies. However, this advantage comes with a price. Regge theory has a relatively narrow range of applicability as compared to Chew’s SMT, as the Regge pole hypothesis works only for elastic types of scattering phenomena. Recall that in the previous section in drawing the distinction between model theories of HEP and their phenomenological models, I have held the view that phenomenological models are constructed primarily for the purpose of extracting testable predictions from model theories which, when taken all by themselves, do not offer testable predictions about their target phenomena. Also, I have argued, phenomenological models have a limited range of applicability, as the structural elements—which come in the form of mechanisms, hypotheses and techniques—they involve work only in the sub-domains of the target phenomena of the model theories. So, it seems clear that the way Regge theory was constructed out of Chew’s SMT and the role it played in the scattering-matrix research program perfectly illustrates the distinction I have drawn between model theories of HEP and their phenomenological models. This in turn suggests Regge theory as the phenomenological model of Chew’s SM theory.

5. A Closer Look at the Theory-Experiment Relationship in HEP in 1960s
In the preceding sections, I have discussed theory construction in HEP in its historical context. I have argued in favor of a three-fold distinction regarding how the term “theory” figures in HEP. The upshot of this discussion is that in HEP there is no single connotation as to what the term “theory” means.  Rather, this term should be read in its triple connotation of background theory, model theory and phenomenological model. Thus, one needs to consider the philosophical implications of this categorization of theories of HEP in terms of scientific experimentation. In contrast to an undifferentiated theory-experiment relationship held by the theory dominated view of scientific experimentation, this categorization suggests that “theory” and experiment may interact in different forms. This in turn brings out the possibility for the existence of different types of theory-ladenness in the scientific practice of HEP. In this section, I will consider experiments from the history of HEP and discuss them in terms of relations that pertain to the concept of theory-ladenness. My discussion is also intended to highlight some major theoretical achievements that went together with experimentation. 


5. 1 Elastic Proton-Proton Scattering Experiments: A Case for Theory-Driven Experimentation

As mentioned earlier, Regge theory offers experimentally testable predictions about strong interactions. More specifically, according to Regge theory, elastic​[30]​ hadron-hadron scattering differential scattering cross section  —whose integration over the entire solid angle  yields the total scattering cross section —obeys the following expression:
                                         
where is the negative of the square of the four-momentum transfer, S is the energy variable:, and L(t) represents the change in the angular momentum, and the left hand side in the above equation stands for the differential scattering cross section of the hadron-hadron scattering. At high energies, F(t) is an exponentially falling function of t, which is always negative in the physical region, and L is supposed to be less than 1. From these considerations, Regge theory makes the following predictions: (1) the scattering cross section should decrease exponentially with increasing momentum transfer t, and (2) the width of the forward scattering peak should shrink exponentially with increasing energy S. Soon after the formulation of Regge theory, a series of HEP experiments were launched on elastic proton-proton (p-p) collisions in order to test the above predictions of Regge theory. I regard these experiments as theory-driven in the sense of TDE. The following discussion is intended to make this claim plausible as well as to give an insight about elastic p-p scattering experiments.
What is to be noted first with regards to p-p scattering experiments is that they were planned and launched with quite specific expectations about elastic p-p collisions. The below passage, from a report by one of the experimental groups who conducted p-p scattering experiments, illustrates this point quite clearly: 
This experiment is part of a program to study basic strong interactions in the energy range … ~10-20 BeV. These measurements are of great interest due to the striking predictions made by Regge pole theory and allow a critical evaluation of the theory. If the energy is sufficiently high … one would expect—as predicted by Chew and Frautschi and others—a shrinkage of [the scattering cross section] (logarithmic with [energy]) corresponding at low [momentum transfer].​[31]​

But, the fact that p-p scattering experiments were launched with some clear expectations about their outcomes is not enough to conclude that these experiments are theory-driven in the sense of TDE. At this point, it is to be recalled that TDE, as I have defined in the preceding discussion, requires other stages of the experimental process—such as experimental design, data acquisition and data analysis—to be carried out in a “theory-regulated” way. Now, let us see how the experimental design and the data acquisition steps were carried out in p-p scattering experiments. First, the fact that p-p experiments were aimed to test the predictions of Regge theory had a significant impact on the selection of the phenomena to be scrutinized in these experiments. Only the forward scattering region, which corresponds to elastic scatterings, was probed, so that the data were only taken in this region. It is to be noted that the forward scattering region is the only region in which the predictions of Regge theory can be tested. As a result, the backward scattering region was disregarded. This points out that the instrumental arrangement in p-p scattering experiments was specific to phenomena relevant to the testing of Regge theory. Hence, I conclude, the experimental design in p-p scattering experiments was constructed and the data were taken in compliance with the theoretical framework of Regge theory. 
The impact of Regge theory on p-p scattering experiments is also manifest in the way the collected data were used. The data analysis was conducted with the aim of extracting information that could be used to draw conclusions about the predictions of Regge theory. More specifically, the collected cross section data were plotted against the momentum transfer at different energies values. It was found that the width of the forward scattering peak decreased with increasing energy, and that its tail fell of exponentially with increasing momentum transfer. That is, the results were compatible with the predictions of Regge theory. Moreover, the collected data were also used to determine the numerical values of the function F(t) at different momentum transfer values. Here, it is worth pointing out that F(t) is a purely mathematical quantity that represents the high energy behavior of the scattering cross section. In this sense, its numerical determination requires the formalism of Regge theory, which connects it to cross section, energy and momentum values, i.e., directly measurable quantities in a scattering experiment. The numerical results of the function F(t) were found to exhibit an exponentially decaying behavior with increasing momentum transfer t, while remaining virtually independent of energy values. This result was also compatible with the theoretical framework of Regge theory, in which F(t) was defined to be only a function of the momentum transfer t. The elastic p-p scattering experiments ended with the conclusion that elastic p-p scattering cross section exhibited a behavior as predicted by Regge theory. My conclusion regarding the data analysis in p-p scattering experiments is that it was more narrowly intended as not aiming to the discovery of unforeseen patterns hidden in the elastic scattering data, but solely to the verification or disproval of Regge theory, thus requiring an appeal to the theoretical framework of Regge theory.
Thus, we can say that successive stages of elastic p-p scattering experiments were carried out by appealing to the theoretical framework of Regge theory. Put it differently, Regge theory can be said to have provided a definite road-map for elastic p-p scattering experiments to proceed from its initial design up to its final stage. This diagnosis allows me to call elastic p-p scattering experiment theory-driven in the sense of TDE. 
The success of Regge theory in the description of hadron-hadron scattering hindered the study of backward scattering region—where the momentum transfer was large—for other types of interactions like e-p scatterings. Until the mid 1960s, Chew’s SMT and its phenomenological application Regge theory gradually became accepted as the dominant view in HEP. The first challenge against this dominant view came from the quark theory, which I shall consider in the next section.

5.2. Interlude: Gell-Mann’s Quark Model 
In a two-page article entitled “A Schematic Model of Baryons and Mesons”​[32]​ published in Physics Letters in 1964, Murray Gell-Mann, a theoretical physicist at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), proposed that hadrons were composed of much more fundamental particles which he called “quarks.”​[33]​ Gel-Mann also contended that there were two types of quarks, namely “up” (u) and “down” (d) quarks with spin 1/2 and baryon number 1/2. In addition, according to Gel-Mann’s proposal, quarks carried fractional electric charges—a view which was in opposition with the general scientific belief whose root dated back to Milikan’s oil drop experiment which demonstrated that electric charge existed in nature as integral multiples of the charge of the electron.
Gel-Mann’s quark model posed a real challenge to the scientific community, which was highly satisfied by the success of Regge theory in the description of strong interactions. Gel-Mann’s proposal was bringing back again the idea that some particles were more “fundamental” than the others. Obviously, this was an idea to which the proponents of SMT, who were subscribed to the view of “nuclear democracy”, were highly opposed. On the other hand, the quark model was successful in solving some symmetry problems SMT theory could not account for.​[34]​ 
The first real reaction of the scientific community towards the quark model was to look for particles of fractional charge in accelerator experiments. The second alternative was to look for quarks in cosmic rays. And, the third option was to devise more elaborate versions of Milikan oil drop experiments and search for fractional electric charges. However, none of these methods had produced any evidence for the existence of quarks.​[35]​ And, the lack of experimental evidence had been a major reason behind the reluctance of scientific community in the acceptance of Gel-Mann’s quark model. 


5. 3 The Electron-Proton Scattering Experiments at SLAC: A Case for Non-Theory-Driven Experimentation 

In this subsection, my aim is to describe the inelastic scattering program in HEP that was launched in 1967 at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (hereafter SLAC). At this stage, I want to give a very brief account of the earlier elastic scattering program. 
The elastic scattering of electron from a nucleus was first observed by a group of physicists led by Robert Hofstadter by using a 15.7 MeV external beam from the 22 MeV betatron. The data obtained at the end of a series of experiments​[36]​ showed that the elastic scattering cross section decreased sharply with increasing momentum transfer. This strengthened the belief that proton had an extended internal structure, rather than the previously imagined point-like structure. The data also revealed that the size of the nucleons (protons or neutrons) was roughly cm. These experimental findings marked the beginning of a new era for the search of substructure of the proton, while bringing Hofstadter the Nobel Prize in 1961. At this point, it is to be noted that the electron beam energies at that time were still low to be able to study the inelastic scattering between electrons and protons. The next research avenue in experimental HEP towards the mid 1960s had shaped up to be the study of inelastic scattering of the electrons from the proton. But, the particle physics community was urgently in need of a better accelerator technology that would allow the study of inelastic scattering of electrons from nucleons. 
The construction of a linear accelerator that would surpass the already used accelerators had been proposed in 1957 by Stanford University physicists, and the proposal had been approved by the US Congress in 1962. This was a $114 million project, and its aim was to construct a linear accelerator at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) that could accelerate electrons up to 22 GeV. The construction of the accelerator was completed in 1966, and the collaboration consisting of physicists from SLAC, MIT and Caltech launched a program aiming at the analysis of the inelastic electron-proton scattering. The main goal of this project was to study in detail the bound state properties of hadrons—especially of protons and neutrons—, which the earlier elastic scattering experiments could not capture. 
Until the late 1960s, there was no detailed account of the internal structure of hadrons, especially of protons. This was partly due to the fact that during 1960s the physics of hadronic processes was largely taken up within the framework of Regge theory, according to which the very concept of “internal structure” was not an appropriate concept to describe hadrons. At the time when the e-p scattering program was initiated the only available phenomenological model about hadronic processes was Regge theory, which was able to account only for the elastic scattering between hadrons. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, QFT was beset by the problem of renormalization, which made almost impossible the study of hadrons. In this sense, there was a real lack of a phenomenological model to study the inelastic scattering of electrons from nucleons. In the absence of a workable phenomenological model, physicists relied on their intuitions that stemmed from their commitments to Regge theory. As a result, they drew a hasty conclusion that, as in the case of p-p scattering experiments, the scattering cross section would diminish with increasing momentum transfer. 
The Caltech-MIT-SLAC collaboration group first examined the elastic scattering of electrons from proton. The data obtained showed that the scattering cross section fell rapidly as the momentum transfer during the scattering increased.​[37]​ This result was compatible with the expectations of the group. The next step to be pursued according to the proposal of the experimental group was the study of inelastic scattering between electron and proton. At this stage of the project, Caltech group decided not to take part in the remainder of the project—namely, in the measurement of inelastic cross sections for electron-proton scattering. The group members were thinking that the inelastic scattering cross section would exhibit the same behaviors as those of elastic scattering, and pursuing the project further would simply mean waste of both time and money.​[38]​  The reason behind this decision, which reflects the expectations of the group, is worth being stated here. Jerome Friedman—who was one of the leaders of the MIT-SLAC-Caltech collaboration and the winner of the 1990 Nobel Prize in physics—says: 
When the experiment was planned, there was no clear theoretical picture of what to expect. The observations of Hofstadter in his pioneering studies of elastic electron scattering from the proton showed that the proton had a size of cm and a smooth charge distribution. This result, plus the theoretical framework that was most widely accepted at the same time, suggested to our group when the experiment was planned that the deep inelastic electron-proton cross sections would fall rapidly with increasing [momentum transfer during the scattering.]​[39]​

In a private communication, Friedman expressed a similar view: 
Our initial  experiment was planned and carried out without regard to any  predictions from the world of theory. It was meant to be an exploratory investigation of electro-production of nucleon resonances and of highly 
inelastic scattering from the  nucleon in a new energy  range.  We had hoped that such a study might shed some light on the structure of the nucleon.  It was really a fishing expedition.  It was really a fishing expedition.​[40]​ (emphasis added)

The remainder of the e-p scattering program was carried out by the MIT-SLAC collaboration, which soon started getting the first results from the inelastic scattering experiments. In contrast to the expectation of the group, at large scattering angles and at high energies, which corresponded to high momentum transfer during scattering, the scattering cross sections did not change considerably and remained close to those at small angles. In other words, what the data revealed about inelastic scattering was that the dependence of inelastic cross section on momentum transfer was rather weak. Figure 1, which is excerpted from a publication of MIT-SLAC collaboration​[41]​, depicts the behavior of e-p inelastic scattering spectrum. 

Figure 1: SLAC inelastic cross sections (σ) as a function of momentum-transfer (). The upper curves represent inelastic cross-section measurements, and the lowest one represents the data from elastic scattering.
What is important to note with regards to my discussion above is that e-p scattering experiments began and proceeded without having any workable theory or phenomenological model about hadronic processes. In this sense, the success of scattering program at SLAC came not in the guidance of a definite theory, but rather after the exploration of the backward scattering region which was previously ignored. Here, what I mean by exploration can best be understood as looking for regularities in the scattering spectrum and upon this trying to estimate how inelastic e-p scattering might depend on different regions of the spectrum. It is to be noted that the fact that there were no theoretical account of what the scattering would yield at the time when the e-p scattering experiments were conducted implies these experiments are not driven by any theory in the sense of TDE. This is also manifest in the various stages of the experimental process in e-p scattering experiments. Unlike the case of earlier elastic p-p scattering experiments, the experimental design of e-p scattering experiments was not specific to any theory. Even though, due to their commitments to Regge theory, physicists had some expectations about the outcomes of e-p scattering experiments, namely that scattering cross sections would be low in backward scattering region, their expectations were not decisive in the instrumental arrangement. It is to be noted that instrumental arrangement in e-p scattering experiments was not intended to serve only those expectations of physicists, but rather it made it possible to probe the forward scattering region as well as the backward one which was previously deemed to be an uninteresting region for scattering experiments. This in turn implies that the data acquisition in e-p scattering experiments was accomplished without having complied with a particular theoretical framework. 
In order to understand how the data analysis was carried out in e-p scattering experiments, let us have a closer look at how the collected cross section data were used in these experiments. The first unexpected feature of cross section data was discovered when the data were plotted as a function of the square of the four-momentum transfer,  for constant values of the invariant mass of the recoiling target system defined: W  , where E is the energy of the incident electron,  is the energy of the scattered electron,  is the scattering angle and M is the mass of the proton. It was found that as W increases, the  dependence of cross section appeared to decrease. At the time when the inelastic e-p scattering experiment was carried out, since there were no theoretical predictions of what the scattering cross section data would look like as a function of  and W, this finding of MIT-SLAC collaboration should be regarded as a discovery rather than an experimental verification of a previously stated theoretical result. This suggests that, unlike the case of earlier p-p scattering experiments, the data analysis in e-p scattering experiments was not intended to the verification or disproval of any theory whatsoever. Nor was it directed towards discovering further empirical consequences of an existing theory. 
Another exciting feature of the inelastic electron-proton scattering was understood by following a suggestion of James Daniel Bjorken, who was at that time a working theoretical physicist in the HEP theory division of SLAC.​[42]​ Sidney Drell and John Dirk Walecka from Stanford University had given a formulation of the inelactic electron-proton scattering cross section by using the concept of “structure function.” According to this formulation, the cross section are functions of structure functions W1 and W2, which represent the physically interesting parts of the cross section to be investigated, and which in turn are functions of the variables and v, which represent the momentum transfer squared and energy lost of the electron during the scattering, respectively.​[43]​ Bjorken had elaborated on this formalism and conjectured that in the large limit of the ratio of and v, W1 and the product vW2 are functions only of the ratio ω=Mv/(where M stands for the proton mass), rather than and v independently. Since, according to Bjorken’s proposal, the dependence of W1 and vW2 on ω represents the scaling between v and that feature of cross section data was called “scaling.” Upon Bjorken’s proposal, MIT-SLAC group made a plot of W1 and the product vW2 against ω, and realized that the data exhibited scaling feature as almost described by Bjorken. The graphs in Figure 2, which are excerpted from a publication of MIT-SLAC collaboration, demonstrate the scaling feature of inelastic electron-proton scattering cross section data.​[44]​

Figure 2: 2MW1 and vW2 for the proton as functions of ω for W> 2.6 GeV, >1 (GeV/), and R=0.18.

It is to be noted that the fact that the inelastic scattering data were re-assessed in the light of Bjorken’s explanation for scaling does not render e-p scattering experiments theory-driven in the sense of TDE, which requires a continuous impact of theory on various stages of experimentation. At this point, the following quotation from Friedman is worth mentioning here: 
The comparison [of cross section data] with scaling was really an afterthought.  None of us understood what the physical significance of scaling was at that time.​[45]​

Friedman’s words suggest that Bjorken’s explanation of scaling was not taken into account by the MIT-SLAC collaboration during the initial design and various conduction stages of e-p scattering experiments. This is also manifest in the sequence of the papers published by MIT-SLAC collaboration. The finding of weak  dependence and the scaling feature of the cross section data were reported in separate papers by the group members.​[46]​ In view of these, I argue, it would be correct to attribute the role played by Bjorken’s account of scaling in e-p scattering experiments to the latter significance of these experiments. The above discussion makes it clear that no theoretical account had an impact on the successive stages of e-p scattering experiments to the extent that it rendered them theory-driven in the sense of TDE. 
Even though I reject the validity of TDE in the context of inelastic electron-proton scattering experiments, I admit that there is a sense in which e-p scattering experiments are theory-laden. In other words, I claim, the fact that e-p scattering experiments are not driven by any theory does not necessarily imply that other theoretical considerations did not play any role in carrying out e-p scattering experiments and that these experiments are theory-free. Rather, I think that theoretical considerations were used in performing e-p scattering experiments. For example, during the conduction of these experiments, detectors were used to detect and to determine the number of scattered electrons per scattering angle. In this way, the ratio of the flux of scattered electrons to the flux of incident electrons was calculated. Experimenters identified this ratio as the differential scattering cross section of the interaction between incident electrons and the proton target. Given that in QM differential scattering cross section represents the probability that a particular nuclear reaction will take place, identification of the flux ratio of electrons as the differential scattering cross section obviously requires an appeal to QM. 
Moreover, the data analysis in e-p scattering experiments was accomplished by performing radiative corrections on the cross section data. Since the radiative effects would contribute to the measured cross section at a fixed energy and angle, in scattering experiments involving charged particles radiative corrections must be made in order to eliminate the effects of the radiation of photons by electrons. In the case of e-p scattering experiments, radiative corrections were performed by taking into account different ways in which electron might emit and absorb a photon during its interaction with proton. To this effect, by appealing to QED, Feynman diagrams were drawn for each case and by using these diagrams contributions coming from the interaction of the electron with photon were calculated. In light of these contributions, the measured cross section data were revised as to yield only the contribution coming from the interaction of electron with proton. 
So, it is clear that both the data acquisition stage and the data analysis stage in e-p scattering experiments were performed by making use of theoretical considerations from theories of HEP. However, since these theoretical considerations were restricted to individual stages of experimentation, they do not continuously regulate successive stages of e-p scattering experiments in such a way as to render e-p scattering experiments theory-driven in the sense of TDE.
5.4- Theory is on the Rise: Feynman’s Parton Model, the Discovery of the Asymptotic Freedom, and the Emergence of QCD

The findings of the MIT-SLAC collaboration were made public by the director of the SLAC, Wolfgang Panofsky, in the 14th International Conference on High Energy Physics held in Vienna in 1969.​[47]​ The inelastic scattering experiments ended up with a puzzling situation. The upshot was that the cross section for e-p inelastic scattering exhibits two seemingly distinct features, namely the weak dependence of cross section on the momentum transfer during the scattering, and the scaling feature of structure functions. Although, something about the theoretical implications of the data was hinted in the words of Panofsky: “Therefore theoretical speculations are focused on the possibility that [inelastic e-p scattering ] data might give evidence on the behavior of point like, charged structures within the nucleon.”​[48]​, no body at that time had a clear explanation regarding the findings of MIT-SLAC collaboration. In his Nobel Lecture, Friedman quotes the above words of Panofsky’s and states that the view expressed by Panofsky “was not the prevailing point of view. Even if one had proposed a constituent model at that time it was not clear that there were reasonable candidates for the constituents.​[49]​ After the data were published in an issue of Physical Review Letters in October 1969, physics community was challenged by an explanation given by Nobel Prize winner Caltech physicist Richard Feynman. 
In the summer of 1968 August, Feynman, who had been trying to understand hadron-hadron interactions since mid-1960s, made a visit to SLAC. At that time, Feynman was holding the belief that hadrons constituted of what he called partons which had point-like structures. The inelastic e-p scattering data had strengthened his belief in regard to the existence of partons in the sense that in his view both the weak dependence and scaling observed in e-p scattering could be explained by appealing to what he called partons. Feynman conjectured that high energy hadronic collisions took place between point-like partons. In addition, Feynman assumed that the interaction of partons were negligibly small. Therefore, in Feynman’s parton model, during the scattering of electrons from proton every parton was envisaged to act as “independent” entities. ​[50]​ 
Within the framework of his parton model, Feynman found a plausible way of explaining both the phenomena of scaling and the weak dependence. Feynman regarded the scattering of electron from proton as a process during which the incoming electron emits a photon which then interacts with one of the individual partons in the proton. Feynman’s explanation of the weak dependence rested on an analogy that he drew between e-e scattering and electron-parton scattering. Generally, due to their point-like structures, electrons scatter from each other at large angles. According to Feynman’s thinking, since during the scattering between the incoming electrons and the proton target the actual scattering occured between individual electrons and partons and in addition the partons were thought to be point-like structures we should have expected the electron-parton scattering to take place at larger angles. This was explaining why at larges scattering angles the cross sections did not fall off rapidly in inelastic electron-proton scattering. 
In addition to his explanation for the weak dependence of e-p scattering cross section, we should also note Feynman’s explanation of scaling observed in inelastic e-p scattering experiments. Feynman showed that when each parton was viewed as the carrier of a fraction of the total momentum of the proton, i.e., , then could be identified as , where  was the scaling parameter in Bjorken scaling. Thus, the phenomenon of scaling observed in inelastic scattering of electrons from protons was shown to be a natural consequence of considering protons as composed of point-like structures and carriers of the total momentum of the proton. Figure 3 depicts the electron-proton scattering in Feynman’s parton model.​[51]​ 


Figure 3: The deep-inelastic electron-proton scattering in the parton model.  and  represent the incident and final momentum of the electron, respectively, q stands for the photon exchanged during the scattering, and x is a certain fraction of the proton’s momentum.

On the other hand, Bjorken had informed Curt Callan and David Gross of his results​[52]​ about scaling prior to their publication.​[53]​ Upon Bjorken’s formulation of scaling, Callan and Gross showed that  --where and  represent respectively the cross section for longitudinal and transverse polarized virtual photons-- depended heavily on the spin of the constituents of the nucleon--namely, for the proton and the neutron.​[54]​ According to their calculations, if the constituents had spin zero or one, then . But, if they were spin-half particles, then , which in turn entailed that R=0. The experimental confirmation arrived quickly. In an international conference, MIT-SLAC collaboration presented the data showing that R was close to zero.​[55]​ In subsequent experiments, errors were decreased and results which were much closer to zero were obtained.​[56]​ Thus, experimental results of e-p scattering experiments were compatible with the prediction of Callan and Grosss about the constituents of the proton. The explanation given by Callan and Gross was also in compliance with Feynman’s parton model if partons were treated as spin-1/2 particles. This also enhanced physicists’ belief that partons in Feynman’s model could be identified with quarks whose existence had first been proposed by Gel-Mann several years ago. 
The next step came from of a joint work of Gross and his student Franz Wilczek at Princeton University, and independent work of David Politzer​[57]​ at Harvard University. They proposed that at high energies the interactions between the constituents of nucleons, which physicists had started to call quarks, would become weak at short distances. This phenomenon was called “asymptotic freedom” and its discovery was also explaining one of the important features of parton model, which was left unexplained by Feynman, that interactions between the constituents of the protons were negligible. The discovery of asymptotic freedom opened the door to a development of a more comprehensive field theory of hadrons --namely QCD-- that would later replace the earlier S-matrix theory.

6. Concluding Remarks: For a Better Understanding of the Theory-Experiment Relationship

The theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation takes the concept of theory-ladenness undifferentiated.  As a result, all theory-experiment relationships are considered on a par. By contrast, in this paper, I have introduced TDE to distinguish cases where experimentation is performed by continuous application of theory during successive stages of experimentation from the ones in which existing theoretical considerations have no decisive influence on experimentation. The cases of experimentation I have analyzed in this paper illustrate my initials claim about the necessity as well as the usefulness of  the differentiation of TDE from other forms of TLE for a better understanding of the relationship that exists between theory and experiment in the scientific practice. The distinction I have held between TDE and other forms of theory-ladenness led me to identify theory-ladenness figuring in elastic p-p scattering experiments as different from the one in the case of inelastic e-p scattering experiments. I have attributed a weaker role to theory in the latter case and argued that no theoretical account was decisive in planning and performing inelastic e-p scattering experiments. Even though in both cases experimentation is theory-laden, the type of theory-ladenness which is at work is different. This difference stems from the different types of roles theoretical considerations play in these experiments. While in the case of elastic p-p scattering experiments experimentation is enabled by the continuous application of Regge theory on the successive stages of experimentation, in the case of inelastic e-p scattering experiments no theoretical consideration was decisive in carrying out the experimentation.
The above diagnosis also supports my initial consideration that the theory-experiment relationship in HEP should not be taken as uniform due to the fact that the term “theory” in this research field has different connotations which have different bearings on experimentation. While in the case of elastic p-p scattering experiments, where a phenomenological model, namely Regge theory, enters experimentation and renders it theory-driven in the sense of TDE, in the case of inelastic e-p scattering experiments no phenomenological model plays a role in experimentation and as a result of this experimentation is carried out without regard to any predictions about the phenomena under scrutiny. I by no means draw a necessary link between theory-driven experimentation and phenomenological models of HEP such that all theory-driven experiments in HEP are carried out by phenomenological models. But, given their capability of offering experimentally testable predictions, I assert that theory-driven experiments in HEP are more likely to be carried out by phenomenological models. 
Differentiating TDE from other forms of TLE and attributing a less significant role to theory in cases where experimentation is not theory-driven might help us to identify the exploratory character of scientific experimentation, which is generally overlooked due to commitments to the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation. In a similar vein to Steinle, I take the term “exploratory” to designate experiments which are performed without receiving any significant theoretical input about their target phenomena and whose outcomes contribute in an essential way to the future research. My second case study has shown the usefulness of this differentiation to correctly identify the role of theory in inelastic e-p scattering experiments, where experimentation is carried out without having any workable theoretical account regarding the scattering phenomena under scrutiny. Thus, the received conception of TLE, according to which experiments are conducted only to ascertain the predictions of scientific theories, seems far less plausible in the case of inelastic e-p scattering experiments. I argue that the exploratory character of inelastic e-p scattering experiments lies in the fact that they prompted the study of the short-distance behavior of the nucleon, which was previously ignored by physicists due to their commitments to Regge theory. This fact was emphasized by Gross in the following words:
[T]heorists and experimentalists reinforced each other’s conviction that the secret of the strong interactions lay in the high-energy behavior of scattering amplitudes at low momentum transfer. Early scattering experiments concentrated, for obvious reasons, on the events that had the largest rates. In the case of the strong interactions, this meant searching for resonant bumps or probing near forward scattering, where the cross section was largest. It was not all realized by theorists that the secret of hadronic dynamics could be revealed by experiments at large momentum transfer that probed the short-distance structure of hadrons. (emphasis added)​[58]​

And, the following words of Gross exemplify the later significance of inelastic e-p scattering experiments in terms of their contribution to the theoretical study of the inner structure of the nucleon: 
SLAC deep-inelastic scattering experiments had a profound impact on me. They clearly showed that the proton behaved, when observed over short times, as if it were made out of pointlike objects of spin one-half.​[59]​	

The discovery of the weak momentum transfer dependence of the inelastic e-p scattering cross section without having any prediction about inelastic scattering of electrons from the nucleon, as well as the fact that this finding was later used by theoretical physicists as a backdrop in their study of the inner structure of the nucleon, present a case for the exploratory experimentation in the sense I have described above. This case also suggests the autonomy of scientific experimentation in the sense that scientific knowledge was advanced by experimental work without having received any significant input from theoretical work. On the other hand, the scaling behavior of the inelastic cross section data was discovered following a suggestion made by theoretical physicist Bjorken shows how theoretical work in HEP contributed to the outcomes of inelastic scattering experiments. All these point to an era of mutual interaction and cooperation between theory and experiment, where the question of whether theory or experiment comes first becomes virtually unanswerable.
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